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Abstract. Dynamically typed object-oriented languages enable program-
mers to write elegant, reusable and extensible programs. However, with
the current methodology for program verification, the absence of static
type information creates significant overhead. Our proposal is two-fold:
First, we propose a layer of abstraction hiding the complexity of dy-
namic typing when provided with sufficient type information. Since this
essentially creates the illusion of verifying a statically-typed program,
the effort required is equivalent to the statically-typed case.
Second, we show how the required type information can be efficiently
derived for all type-safe programs by integrating a type inference al-
gorithm into Hoare logic, yielding a semi-automatic procedure allowing
the user to focus on those typing problems really requiring his attention.
While applying type inference to dynamically typed programs is a well-
established method by now, our approach complements conventional soft
typing systems by offering formal proof as a third option besides modi-
fying the program (static typing) and accepting the presence of runtime
type errors (dynamic typing).
1 Introduction
Dynamically typed programming languages refrain from restricting their pro-
grams to ensure operations are only applied to suitable operands. While this
allows experienced programmers to write more elegant, concise and reusable
code, it has the obvious drawback that type errors may occur at runtime.
Recently, object-oriented dynamically typed languages like Python, Ruby
and JavaScript are gaining popularity also on the server-side (Ruby on Rails,
node.js) and are used even for business- [27] and safety-critical [3] applications.
Unfortunately, despite the growing need for correctness guarantees, the lack
of type information causes a large overhead in formal methods like Hoare logic
and severely decreases the effectiveness of automatic reasoning engines compared
to the statically-typed setting (see Section 2.1).
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2There are two ways to deal with this problem:
1) Annotation: Most contemporary approaches to verifying dynamically
typed programs ask the user to manually supply the needed type information
in loop invariants and method contracts [12,23,29,21]. For larger programs, this
induces significant overhead. We argue that manually supplying type information
for all variables is not only tedious, but also often unnecessary, as most of this
information could have been inferred automatically.
2) Translation: Obviously, translating the dynamically typed program into
an equivalent statically typed version1 and then using a Hoare logic for statically-
typed programs (like [2,5]) for verification is also possible. In such a translation
process, type inference algorithms like [17,11] are usually of significant help.
Note, however, that gradual typing [26,4] it not useful in this context, as such
Hoare logics require the the entire program to be well-typed prior to verification.
Additionally, this approach removes any benefit of dynamic typing since it is
equivalent to verifying a statically typed language with type inference.
We propose to get the best of both worlds by integrating an automatic type
safety verifier with Hoare logic into a semi-automatic procedure and using the
derived type information to reduce overhead and enable effective automated
reasoning about dynamically typed programs just like with statically typed ones.
In the context of soft typing [6], our approach can also be understood as offering
proofs of type safety as a third option besides rewriting the program (static
typing) and runtime-checks (dynamic typing).
Concretely, in this paper we describe two components:
1) A layer of abstraction that, given suitable type information, abstracts
from the complexities of dynamic typing and hence reduces the verification of
dynamically typed programs to that of statically typed ones. This also works
with partial type information on a per-expression basis (see Section 2.1).
2) A construction for complementing a Hoare logic with an automatic type
safety verifier, yielding a semi-automatic procedure for deriving type information
with the following properties (see Section 2.4):
– Automation – only typing problems beyond the reach of the automatic ver-
ifier require manual intervention.
– Completeness relative to the Hoare logic – if the Hoare logic is complete, then
type information can be derived for all typesafe programs (see Section 5.2).
– Bidirectional exchange of results – automatically derived type information
can be used in Hoare logic proofs and vice versa, proof results are used by
the automatic verifier to increase precision.
Together, these two components form a novel verification system that makes
the effort additionally required to verify a dynamically typed program propor-
tional to the total complexity of hard typing problems in this program. Unlike
1 After this translation, the static type system should be able to ensure the absence of
type errors, unlike in the embeddings discussed in [15]. Finding such an equivalent
version is undecidable in general and hence requires manual effort (see Section 2.2)
3in annotation-based-approaches, programs with only trivial typing problems re-
quire no additional effort and unlike in translation-based-approaches, all typesafe
programs can be verified.
This paper constitutes our first step towards connecting the (relative) com-
plete Hoare logics [2,5] and advanced reasoning engines developed for statically-
typed object-oriented languages with the advancing automatic type safety ver-
ifiers for dynamically typed languages [21,29,9,17]. In this extended version,
proofs for all theorems and lemmas can be found in Appendix E.
Notation −→p is a sequence p1, ..., pn where n is obvious from context or does
not matter, {−→p } the smallest set containing all its elements and −→a −→b sequence
concatenation.
∆
= means “is defined as” and Nn
∆
= {0, ..., n}, N1n ∆= {1, ..., n}.
2 Overview / Motivation
We will first discuss how correctness proofs can be simplified using sufficient
type information and then how this information can be derived.
2.1 Static- vs. Dynamically-typed Hoare Logic
Apart from the additional need to establish type safety, there are other differ-
ences between Hoare logic for dynamically typed- and statically typed languages
(HLd and HLs ). The latter (like [2,5]), usually share a type system between
programming- and assertion language: the assertion x > 8 denotes the set of
states where the value of a numeric program variable x is larger than 8. In
HLd (like [12]) however, as types are not statically known, all variables are of
type O (object). The assertion x > 8 is hence meaningless as > is not defined for
type O. In this setting, a similar set of states can be denoted by the assertion2
∃i. N(x, i)∧ i > 8 which can be automatically derived from x > 8 given sufficient
type information (the fact that the object referenced by x always represents a
number).
Furthermore, HLs usually include side-effect-free (pure) program expressions
(e) into the assertion language, allowing efficient reasoning using proof rules like
{q[u := e]}u := e{q}
Here, q[u := e] denotes the substitution of all occurrences of a variable u by e
in the assertion q. This rule allows directly deducing weakest preconditions over
assignments like {x + 5 > 8}x := x + 5{x > 8} (1) by letting the expression e
traverse the boundary between program and logic. In HLd , this is not possible
since program expressions could have side-effects. While a subset of side-effect-
free methods can be defined, identifying such pure expressions requires type
information. Without it, establishing a property equivalent to (1) requires ≥ 6
rule applications.
2 the precise meaning of N(x, i) will be explained in Subsection 4.2.
4This observation is given significance by the fact that usually most expres-
sions only involve immutable data types like numbers and strings. Regarding
them as side-effecting operations on general object-structures not only com-
plicates proofs, but also significantly decreases the effectiveness of automated
reasoning engines . For instance, assertions can often be efficiently established
by SMT solvers over Presburger arithmetic while no similar decision procedure
exists for arbitrary operations over general object-structures.
Section 4 will show how type information can be used to counter these prob-
lems and create the illusion of proving a statically typed program.
2.2 Providing Type Information
Sufficient type information for dynamically typed programs is uncomputable in
general (Section 5.1). However, a number of good approximations exist [17,11]
that we will refer to as automatic type safety verifiers.
It is known that many dynamically typed programs only occasionally diverge
from what would also be possible in static typing disciplines3 and consequently,
that the output of such algorithms is usually sufficient for typing most of their
subexpressions [17, Section 5][11, Section 6].
If the entire program can be typed by a sound automatic verifier, then
HLs could be applied. However, the whole point of dynamic typing is the pos-
sibility to go beyond the limits of such automatic procedures (type systems).
Approaches to verifying these languages thus must also be able to operate under
less ideal circumstances. The following example will illustrate this point.
2.3 The Evaluator Example
Figure 1 depicts a dynamically typed program evaluating arithmetic expressions.
While crafted to provide a hard typing problem, its use of ad-hoc data structures
is not uncommon in Ruby, Python or Javascript.
The class Evaluator has two methods parse() and calc(). The former
parses a string and stores the resulting parse tree in the instance variable @tree,
while the latter evaluates a given parse tree (defaulting to @tree) over a given
environment (a mapping from variable names (strings) to integers).
The example is hard to type because the parse trees are represented as ad-
hoc constructions of nested lists. Numeric constants VALUE, VAR and OP in the
first element distinguish value-, variable- and operation nodes. The types of
the remaining list elements depend on these node types: the second element is
numeric (the value) for value-nodes, a string (the variable name to be looked up
in the environment) for var-nodes and numeric (representing the operation to
be performed) for op-nodes. Only op-nodes use nesting: further list elements are
sub-parse-trees that are to be recursively evaluated to operands.
3 Advanced dynamic features like mixins, traits, method update and dynamic class
hierarchies increase the complexity of type inference. However, in this paper we aim
to study the problem of dynamic typing in isolation and leave them as future work.
5class Evaluator {
method parse(str) { ... }
method calc(env, tree = @tree) {
if tree[0] = VALUE then tree[1]
elseif tree[0] = VAR then env[tree[1]]
elseif tree[0] = OP then
if tree[1] = ADD then calc(env, tree[2]) + calc(env, tree[3])
elseif ...
else nil
fi
else nil
fi
}
}
new Evaluator().parse(input).calc(ENV)
Fig. 1. Relevant part of the evaluator example source code
Typing this example requires deducing precise types for heterogeneous lists
from propositions (like tree[0] = VALUE) about their first element. To the best
of our knowledge there is no automatic procedure able to establish such impli-
cations. Also note that the typing problem can be made even harder: allowing
an arbitrary number of operands in op-nodes, returning strings instead of null,
etc. This example will be used to demonstrate our technique.
2.4 Semi-Automation
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Fig. 2. Overview of the concept
In the concept depicted in Figure 2, the correctness proof is split into two
“layers” (see Section 6.3). While the user (supported by a theorem prover) de-
rives his proof in the higher layer, the lower layer contains type information and
is created and modified solely by the automatic type safety verifier. For this
purpose, the typings (ty) derived for the program pi by the verifier are trans-
lated into proofs (see Section 6.2). While the information contained in this lower
layer proof is already useful for supporting the user’s higher-layer proof (see
6Section 4), the user may at any time decide to refine it by deriving more pre-
cise type information in the higher layer. This information is filtered to make it
interpretable for the verifier and then supplied as trusted assumptions to refine
the lower-layer type information (see Sections 6.1, 6.3).
Note that deriving type information and using the layer of abstraction is not
a strict 2-step process. The latter requires the former only on a per-expression
basis, allowing an interleaving of steps. Concretely, the layer of abstraction ap-
plies to all expressions proven type-safe (see Section 4). Expressions with open
typing problems may be included at any time by proving them type-safe. This
interleaving is possible as our refinements are monotonic (see Section 6.3).
3 Setting
3.1 Model Languages: Dyn and Stat
To explain our methodology in a setting facilitating formal proof we introduce
a pair of minimalistic programming languages that differ only in the fact that
one is dynamically typed (dyn) while the other uses a static type system with
type inference (stat). Like their real-world siblings, the two are imperative,
class-based object-oriented languages including inheritance, method renaming,
dynamic dispatch and constructors. However, they do not support advanced
dynamic features like a dynamic class hierarchy, method update or eval().
Syntax of dyn:
Progd 3 pi ::= −−−→class S u ∈ VL,@x ∈ VI ,C ∈ C,m ∈M
Classd 3 class ::= class C < C {−−−→meth}
Methd 3 meth ::= method m(−→u ){S} | rename m m, Stmtd 3 S ::= S;S | e
Exprd 3 e ::= null | u | @x | this | e == e | e is a? C | e.m(−→e ) | new C(−→e )
| u := e | @x := e | if e then S else S fi | while e do S od
Syntax of stat: – coincides with dyn, except for
Stmts 3 S ::= S;S | eε | u := eε.m(−→eε) | u := new C(−→eε) | u := eε | @x := eε
| if eε then S else S fi | while eε do S od
Exprs 3 eε ::= null | u | @x | this | eε == eε cε ∈ Cnsts , op(−→eε) ∈ Ops
| eε is a? C | cε | op(−→eε) | if eε then eε else eε fi
Syntactic sugar in dyn:
e1 ⊕ e2 ∆= e1.m⊕(e2)
if e then S fi
∆
= if e then S else null fi
false
∆
= new bool(null), true
∆
= false.not()
0 ≡ new num(null), n ∆= (n− 1).succ()
Basic data types in stat:
true, false ∈ Cnsts , ¬ : B 7→ B ∈ Ops
∧,∨,→: B× B 7→ B ∈ Ops
0, 1, ... ∈ Cnsts , =: N× N 7→ B ∈ Ops
+, ∗, div : N× N 7→ N ∈ Ops
Fig. 3. Syntax of dyn and stat
Syntax: The syntax of both dyn and stat is depicted in Figure 3. In dyn,
method bodies consist of statements (S) which in contrast to expressions (e)
can contain sequential composition. Expressions are composed of null, the only
7constant, local- and instance variables (prefixed with @), the self-reference this,
operators for object identity and dynamic type checks, method- and construc-
tor calls, assignments, conditionals and while loops. Note that equality (=) is
desugared to a (class-specific) method call, while object identity (==) is a build-
in operation yielding true iff the two expressions refer to the same object (We
stipulate null == null yields true).
Each class except the predefined class object must specify a parent class
whose methods are inherited. The inheritance relation must be acyclic. Every
class thus transitively inherits from object. Inherited methods may be overwrit-
ten or renamed (using rename). Like in actual dynamically typed languages,
inheritance is mere code reuse and can be removed using an automatic expan-
sion step [22]. Furthermore, we will assume this step to be completed and not
concern ourselves any further with inheritance or renaming.
Semantics: Both dyn and stat programs consist of a main statement S and
sets of classes C, methods M and variables V = VL unionmulti VI where VL and VI are
the sets of local- and instance variables respectively. While each class C ∈ C
has a subset of method declarations MC ⊆M and instance variables VC ⊆ VI ,
every method C.m ∈ M has a subset of local variables VC.m ⊆ VL used in its
method body SC.m. VS = {this, r} ⊂ VL is a set of special variables. While this
references the current object and is not allowed to be assigned to in programs, r
holds the result of the last evaluated expression and cannot be used in programs.
Dyn’s value domain is the set of all objects Dd = DO and its type system
is the lattice of union types represented as sets of class names {C1, ...,Cn} ∈
Td = 2C with the subset-ordering ⊆ (see Figure 4). The null value is con-
tained in every such type. Stat on the contrary distinguishes basic data types
Ts = {O,N,B,S,L,M, ...} and its value domain Ds ∼=
⊎
TDT includes objects,
numbers, booleans, strings, lists and finite maps. We omit definitions of states,
state update etc. as they are standard. To keep track of instance-class relation-
ships we use class references and for every class C introduce a distinct object ρC
as well as a special instance variable @c such that o.@c = ρC iff o is an instance
of class C. Using @c in programs is not permitted.
{C1}{C2} {Cn}...
{num, bool}
⊥ = ∅ = Null
> = {num, ..., Cn} = O
{num}{bool} {list}
N B L {C1}{C2} {Cn}...
{C1, ..., Cn} = O
∅ = Null
⊥
>
Fig. 4. Type lattices of dyn (left) and stat (right)
Comparing Dyn with Stat: Dyn is a pure object-oriented language (objects
are the only values) while stat has basic data types. However, both provide the
same constants and pure (i.e. side-effect-free) operations on them. Dyn desugars
8them to constructor and method calls (see Figure 3), while stat (like usual in
statically typed languages) provides them build-in (cε and op(
−→eε) in Figure 3).
Also, stat expressions are pure. Side-effects are only allowed in statements,
which must only have pure subexpressions. This is not a restriction, as every
dyn-expression can be transformed into a sequence of stat statements by recur-
sively (and in the order of evaluation) replacing subexpressions e by fresh local
variables u and prepending the assignment u := e;.
Every stat program is also a dyn program that evaluates to (an object-
oriented version of) the same result. The only reason that the opposite direction
does not hold is the language restriction imposed by stat’s static type system.
Type Errors: Contrary to stat, which rejects programs deemed unsafe at com-
pile time, dyn allows every syntactically correct program to be executed and
raises type errors at runtime when
– a method call is not supported by its receiver (in this arity) or
– a condition of a conditional or while loop is not boolean
While “message not understood”-errors are fundamentally linked to type-checking
in class-based OO-languages, dynamically typed languages often allow condi-
tions to be of arbitrary type. Nevertheless, the second error condition models a
common error class where a built-in operation supports a fixed set of types.
Many dynamically typed languages raise type errors when accessing vari-
ables prior to assignment. We will leave this as future work and consider all
local (instance) variables to be initialized to null prior to method executions
(on instantiation). Also, type errors are often treated as exceptions, allowing
interception and handling. For simplicity, we will consider them as fatal.
3.2 Hoare Logic
The presentation of dyn and stat’s program logics closely follows [2,1]. We start
by introducing the assertion language (Figure 5). Essentially, it is weak second
order logic, extended with the same constants cε, operations op(
−→
l ) and types
used in stat. It will be used to reason about both dyn and stat, however.
Assertions contain typed logical expressions (l). Such expressions consist of
typed logical variables, local/instance program variables u/l.@x (of type O in
dyn and of some type T ∈ Ts in stat / same, with l being of type O) including
this, typed constants and typed operations. Contrary to program expressions,
logical expressions can access instance variables of objects other than this.
Logical expressions may only occur as parts of well-typed equations. Fol-
lowing [5], undefined operations like dereferencing a null value or accessing a
sequence with an index out of bounds (l[n] with n ≥ |l|) yield a null value and
equality is non-strict with respect to such values (null = null is true) to ensure a
two-valued logic. Assertions are boolean combinations of such equations allowing
quantification over finite sequences of elements of basic types.
We also introduce the following abbreviation for making reasoning about
runtime types more convenient:
9Asrt 3 p, q ::= JlK ∈ T, T ∈ TJlK ∈ {C1, ...,Cn} ∆= l 6= null → [l.@c = ρC1 ∨ ... ∨ l.@c = ρCn ]
The reader may convince himself/herself that the following implications hold:JlK ∈ T1 ∧ JlK ∈ T2 → JlK ∈ T1 u T2 JlK 6∈ T → JlK ∈ > \ TJlK ∈ T1 ∨ JlK ∈ T2 → JlK ∈ T1 unionsq T2 l1 = l2 → ∃T. Jl1K ∈ T ∧ Jl2K ∈ T
Selected differences between the Hoare-style axiomatic semantics for dyn and
stat are contrasted in Figure 6. While the semantics for stat are standard4, the
rules for dyn were modeled after [12]. Omitted rules are listed in Appendix B. In
Hoare triples {p}S{q}, the special variable r is only allowed in the postcondition
q and denotes the return value of S. The rules will be analyzed in the next
section.
4 Layer of Abstraction
Let us compare the proof rules given in Figure 6. Obviously, the dyn rules are
more complicated than their stat counterparts. Analyzing their differences, one
can identify three core reasons why reasoning about dynamically typed programs
is more complex than reasoning about statically typed ones.
1. Type safety: In Figure 6, the parts ensuring type safety are marked . Such
type safety preconditions are unnecessary in statically typed languages.
2. Mapping objects to values: Hoare logic for dynamically typed languages
often uses predicates to map between program objects and logical values. For
instance, the COND rule has to use the predicate B() to establish a correspon-
dence between the program expressions e and the logical expression b of type B.
This additional layer of indirection not only reduces readability, but also hinders
substitutions for pure expressions (see next paragraph).
3. Side-effecting expressions: In the stat-rules ASGN and COND, pure pro-
gram expressions eε and bε are directly used in logical assertions. Here, the clever
design choice of a shared type system pays off. Unfortunately, dynamic typing
forces us to relinquish this benefit, as the types of expressions are not statically
known and impure expressions are ill-suited for logical reasoning. Observe also
how dyn’s METH rule models the evaluation order using a sequence of interme-
diate predicates pi, which would not be necessary for pure expressions. However,
since dyn treats operations as method calls, the METH rule needs to be applied
even for pure operations like +, <,∧, etc, making properties of assignments and
conditionals even more tedious to derive.
The following sections will explain how the layer of abstraction mitigates
these issues.
4.1 Type Safety Preconditions
Like already mentioned, the fact that type errors are runtime events in dynam-
ically typed languages gives rise to the following notion of correctness:
4 they closely follow other Hoare logics for statically typed languages [2,5,1]
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p, q ∈ Asrt ::= l = l | ¬p | p ∧ p | ∃v : T∗. p T ∈ Ts
l ∈ LExp ::= v | u | l.@x | null | this | if l then l else l fi | l = l | |l| | l[l] | cε | op(−→l )
with the usual abbreviations: p∨q ∆= ¬(¬p∧¬q), p→ q ∆= ¬p∨q, p↔ q ∆= p→ q∧q → p,
∃v : T. p ∆= ∃v′ : T∗. |v′| = 1 ∧ p[v/v′[0]], ∀v : T. p ∆= ¬∃v : T. ¬p
Fig. 5. Syntax of the assertion language
Hoare logic rules for
dyn stat
RULE: Assignment (ASGN)
{p}e{q[u := r]}
{p}u := e{q} {p[u := eε]}u := eε{p}
RULE: Conditional (COND) ( type-safe partial correctness)
{p}e{r ∧ bool test}
{r ∧ b}S1{q}
{r ∧ ¬b}S2{q}
{p} if e then S1 else S2 fi {q}
{p ∧ bε}S1{q} {p ∧ ¬bε}S2{q}
{p} if bε then S1 else S2 fi {q}
where b is a predicate and bool test
∆
= JrK ∈ {bool} ∧ B(r, b)
RULE: Method Call (METH)
{pi}ei{pi+1[ui := r]} for i ∈ Nn
{pn+1}u0.m(u1, ..., un){q}
{p0}e0.m(e1, ..., en){q}
{p}u := u0.m(u1, ..., un){q}
{p[u0, ..., un := eε0, ..., eεn]}
u := eε0.m(eε1, ..., eεn){q}
where ui ∈ VL fresh, ui 6∈ var(ej) ∪ change(ej) for all i, j ∈ Nn.
RULE: Recursion (REC) (dyn and stat) ( type-safe partial correctness)
A ` {p}S{q},
A ` {pi}begin local this,−→ui := v′i,−→vi ;Si end{qi}, i ∈ N1n
pi → Jv′iK ∈ {Ci}, i ∈ N1n
{p}S{q}
where method mi(
−→ui){Si} ∈ MCi , A ≡ {p1}v′1.m1(−→v1){q1}, ..., {pn}v′n.mn(−→vn){qn}.
Fig. 6. Comparison of dynamically typed and statically typed Hoare logic rules
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Definition 1 (Type-safe partial correctness). {p}S{q} holds in the sense
of type-safe partial correctness (written |=τp {p}S{q}) if every non-diverging,
non-failing computation starting in a state satisfying p does not abort with a type
error, but ends in a state satisfying q.
The preconditions particular to proof rules for type-safe partial correctness are
called type safety preconditions. Being orthogonal to preventing divergence (t)
and failures (f) (calling a method on a null value) as well as ensuring the post-
condition (p), these correctness notions may be freely combined. Total correct-
ness would hence be denoted τtfp. In the proof rules given in Figure 6 (and
Appendix B), τ -preconditions are marked .
In HLs , type-safety preconditions are unnecessary. Regarding such precon-
ditions, correctness proofs in statically-typed languages resemble those in dy-
namically typed languages for type-unsafe correctness notions. Omitting these
preconditions hence is a first step in proving dynamically typed programs like
statically-typed ones. This can be achieved by treating type safety issues seper-
ately from other correctness issues.
Definition 2 (Decomposition). The following rule is added to the proof sys-
tem for a type-safe notion of correctness (τX):
where `X refers to the corresponding type-unsafe variant`X {p}S{q}
`τp {p}S{true}
{p}S{q}
of the proof system while `τp always refers to the proof
system for type-safe partial correctness.
Correctness of the decomposition rule follows directly from the semantic
definition for type-safe partial correctness. Intuitively, it states that whenever
|=τp {p}S{true} and the precondition p have been established for some state-
ment S, we can omit type safety preconditions when reasoning about S, although
our program is dynamically-typed.
4.2 Mapping Objects to Values
Mapping predicates are a further peculiarity of HLd . However, when the types
of all used variables are known, those predicates can be generated automatically.
We will now provide a “virtual” variable uˆ of the corresponding base type for
each object variable u that can be safely mapped.
First, a subset of “pure” (i.e. immutable) classes Cε ⊆ C along with a function
Ψ mapping classes from Cε to corresponding base types T ∈ Ts of the assertion
language must be defined. For dyn, this mapping is
Ψ(num) = N, Ψ(bool) = B, Ψ(list) = L, ...
The mapping can be extended to union types T ∈ Td by defining
Ψ({}) = Null , Ψ({C}) = Ψ(C) for C ∈ Cε and Ψ(T ) = O otherwise.
12
For each type T ∈ Ts, there is usually already a mapping predicate T(o, v) :
O×DT 7→ B for mapping objects to values as well as a safety predicate safeT(o) :
O 7→ B defining under what condition this mapping is safe. For N these are5
N(o, n) ∆= safeN(o)→ (o.@pred = null→ n = 0 ∧
o.@pred 6= null→ N(o.@pred, n− 1)) and
safeN(o)
∆
= o 6= null ∧ JoK ∈ {num}
We then introduce a new assertion language AsrtΥ allowing the use of au-
tomatically mapped virtual variables xˆ. Its semantics is defined in terms of a
mapping Υ : AsrtΥ 7→ Asrt to the old assertion language.
Definition 3 (Automatic Variable Mapping).
Let x1, ..., xn be a sequence of variables that can be safely mapped to types
T1, ...,Tn and for which xˆi occur free in p for i ∈ N1n. Also, let vxˆ1 , ..., vxˆn be a
corresponding sequence of logical variables of types T1, ...,Tn. Then,
Υ (p)
∆
= ∃vxˆ1 : T1, ..., vxˆn : Tn. ΥS(p) ∧ ΥM (p)
ΥS(p)
∆
= p[xˆ1, ..., xˆn := vxˆ1 , ..., vxˆn ], ΥM (p)
∆
= T1(x1, vxˆ1) ∧ ... ∧ Tn(xn, vxˆn)
The precise definition of which variables can be “safely mapped” depends
on the type information available. For the verifier that will be discussed in Sec-
tion 6.1, the xi may be local variables u or instance variables of the current object
this.@x. Note that AsrtΥ conservatively extends Asrt , as any assertion p ∈ Asrt
is mapped to itself. We hence assume Υ to be implicitly applied to all assertions,
enabling the pervasive use of automatic object mapping. For instance, assuming
that safeN(u) could be established in the lower layer, the Υ -assertion uˆ < 5 can
be used instead of the equivalent ∃vuˆ : N. vuˆ < 5 ∧ N(u, vuˆ). To formally show
that the automatic object mapping allows us to trivially map stat assertions
into dyn assertions, we need a mapping Θ between their states.
Translating States: Θ(σs)
∆
= σd where σd is derived from σs by introducing
for every base type T ∈ Ts\{O,Null} a (possibly infinite) set of objects {ov | v ∈
DT∧T(ov, v)} and substituting every variable x of base type T, holding the value
v ∈ DT by a variable x of type O, referencing the object ov. Furthermore, for
each base type T ∈ Ts \{O,Null}, we identify any two objects o1, o2 iff T(o1, v1),
T(o2, v2) and v1 = v2. We lift this equivalence to dyn states in the natural way.
Translating Assertions: Θ(p)
∆
= p[x1, ..., xn := xˆ1, ..., xˆn] where xi are all
variables that can be safely mapped and occur free in p.
Theorem 1. For all assertions p and stat states σ: σ |= p iff Θ(σ) |= Θ(p).
The automatic mapping requires safety predicates to be pre-established in the
lower layer, which requires both type information and tracking of null values.
4.3 Pure Expressions
HLs allow highly effective reasoning by including (syntactically identified) pure
program expressions into their logical assertions. In this section, we will show
5 Expressing them using quantification over sequences instead of recursion is possible,
but less readable.
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that assuming the availability of type information in the lower layer, this concept
is also applicable to dynamically-typed languages.
To define a pure subset of dyn expressions, one complements the set of “pure”
classes Cε with a set of “pure” (i.e. side-effect-free) methods Mε ⊆ M and ex-
tends the function Ψ to also map method- and constructor calls to corresponding
logical expressions. Such an expression l ∈ LExp of type T with free variables
v0, ..., vn of types T0, ...,Tn can be interpreted as a function fl : T0×...×Tn 7→ T.
We hence denote its type as LExp(T0× ...×Tn 7→ T). The extension of the map-
ping Ψ can then be written as follows:
For every pure operation m of arity n:
Ψ : (T0.m(T1, ...,Tn)→ T) 7→ LExp(T0 × ...× Tn 7→ T)
For every pure constructor new C of arity n:
Ψ : (Ψ(C).init(T1, ...,Tn)→ T) 7→ LExp(T1 × ...× Tn 7→ T)
For the type N these are
Ψ(N.init(Null)) = 0, Ψ(N.init(N)) = v1 + 1,
Ψ(N.add(N)) = v0 + v1, Ψ(N.succ()) = v0 + 1.
It is then possible to define a predicate pure(e) automatically identifying pure
expressions given type information for all variables used. Ψ can be extended to
map such pure program expressions to typed logical expressions. We denote the
type of a pure expression by τ(e). Then, after establishing that
{p[rˆ := Ψ(T0.m(T1, ...,Tn)→ T)]}u0.m(u1, ...,un){p}
with Ti = τ(ui) for all i ∈ Nn holds for all methods in Mε, the following
axiom can be established by induction over the structure of e
AXIOM: PURE EXPR: {p[rˆ := Ψ(e)]}e{p} where pure(e)
Combining the axiom with dyn-specific proof rules yields simplified rules for
pure expressions that closely resemble those for stat. For instance:
AXIOM: PURE ASGN
{p[xˆ := Ψ(e)]}x := e{p}
where pure(e), τ(e) v τ(x).
RULE: PURE COND
{p ∧ Ψ(e)}S1{q} {p ∧ ¬Ψ(e)}S2{q}
{p} if e then S1 else S2 fi {q}
where pure(e) and τ(e) = B.
Definitions for pure(e), Ψ : Exprd 7→ LExp and τ(e) as well as omitted
rules and soundness proofs can be found in Appendix A. Finally, we are able to
state the main theorem of this section: in combination with decomposition and
automatic object mapping, above rules allow verification just like in statically
typed languages. This follows from the fact that stat proofs closely resemble
dyn proofs using these techniques.
Translating Programs: Since stat ⊂ dyn, we simply have Θ(S) ∆= S.
Translating Proofs: Θ(φ) = ϕ is defined inductively over the structure of the
proof φ in Hoare logic for stat. Applications of the rules ASGN,COND,LOOP
and METH need to be substituted for applications of PURE ASGN, PURE
COND, PURE LOOP and PURE METH + PURE ASGN respectively. Note
that this is always possible as stat expressions are pure and well-typed pure
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assignments preserve safety predicates. Applications of all other rules can be
preserved, as they are identical for dyn and stat.
Theorem 2. For every stat program S and every correctness proof φ of a prop-
erty {p}S{q} in Hoare logic for a particular correctness notion of stat programs,
Θ(φ) is a valid proof of the property {Θ(p)}S{Θ(q)} in Hoare logic for a corre-
sponding type-unsafe correctness notion of dyn programs.
Furthermore, since types for stat programs can be inferred, their type-safety
proofs can be constructed automatically (see Section 6.2). Applying the decom-
position rule (Definition 2) then yields a proof for type-safe correctness. It follows
that for statically typable programs, deriving a proof in dyn (using the layer
of abstraction) does not require any more effort than deriving it in stat. The
remainder of this paper will discuss how the layer of abstraction can be applied
to arbitrary dynamically typed programs by deriving the necessary type infor-
mation. In Section 7, we will demonstrate this point by proving the evaluator
example correct.
5 Deriving Type Information
5.1 Type Information and Type Safety
A program pi is called type-safe if no execution of pi can result in a type error.
Type safety is the problem of deciding whether a given program is type-safe.
Since type errors can be regarded as a form of output, type safety is a nontriv-
ial semantic property and hence undecidable for Turing complete languages by
Rice’s theorem.
A type T is an element of a complete lattice (T ,v) = (2C ,⊆). A typing ty
of a program pi is an arbitrary data structure giving rise to a mapping ty(S) :
Stmt 7→ T from sub-statements S of pi to types. It is important to stress that
a sub-statement occurring multiple times in pi is treated as multiple different
statements. One can think of statements as represented by their parse tree nodes.
A typing ty for a program pi is called sound iff in every execution of pi,
whenever a sub-statement S is evaluated to a value v, then v is of a type T v
ty(S). A typing ty is at least as precise as another typing ty ′, written ty v ty ′,
iff for all statements S it holds that ty(S) v ty ′(S).
For a program pi, the least precise type-safe typing ty†pi is a typing where for
every method call e0.m(e1, ..., en), ty
†
pi(e0) = {C ∈ C | C supports method m of
arity n} and for every conditional or while loop with condition e, ty†pi(e) = {bool}
and for all other sub-statements S, ty†pi(S) = >. By definition, a program pi is
type-safe iff it has a sound6 typing ty that is precise enough to establish type
safety (ty v ty†pi).
Type safety verifiers (type inference algorithms) derive a typing for a given
program by over-approximating its behavior. A verifier is sound iff the typings
it derives are.
6 if a method call, conditional or while loop is unreachable, sound typings may assign
the type ⊥ to its receiver / condition.
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Note that given a typing ty for a program pi, it is straightforward to decide
ty v ty†pi. In fact, this would even be possible if ty , like ty†pi, would assign >
to all non-receiver, non-condition subexpressions. However, deciding soundness
usually requires more information. For this reason, sound type safety verifiers
usually a) assign types to all subexpressions and b) provide a set of inference
rules (commonly called a “type system”) allowing to check safety of their derived
typings using this additional type information. A soundness proof for these rules
with respect to the semantics of the programming language is a crucial part of
proving such algorithms sound.
Some algorithms (e.g. context-sensitive ones) even assign multiple types to
each statement (one for each context). While ty(S) in this case yields the union
of all types assigned to S, the soundness proof may differentiate these types.
As type safety verifiers differ, so do their typings. We associate with each
verifier VX a kind of typing capturing its respective format and restrictions.
Between such kinds, It is possible to translate in both directions. However, as the
precision achievable with a verifier VX varies, so does the precision expressible
using VX -typings. For instance, while it is usually possible to translate path-
insensitive typings into path-sensitive ones by assigning the same types to each
path, the reverse direction entails merging paths and thus a loss of precision.
5.2 Type Safety Proofs are Type Information
A type safety proof for a statement S is a proof of the property {p}S{true} for
some precondition p in Hoare logic for type-safe partial correctness. When run
from a state satisfying p, it ensures type-safety of S by establishing all type-safety
preconditions.
Such proofs constitute a kind of typing as their assertions contain type infor-
mation that is by definition sufficient to establish type safety. Soundness of these
typings can be validated using the proof rules of Hoare logic. Before discussing
how to extract type information from a Hoare logic proof, one should state that
this information needs to be compatible with the type safety verifier to be useful
for our purpose. We hence define typing assertions TAsrt ⊂ Asrt as a subset of
the assertion language modeling the capabilities of this verifier.
For instance, the verifier VEx that will be presented in Section 6.1 is based on
a flow-sensitive, path-sensitive data flow analysis. As usual, only local variables
of the current method and instance variables of the current object are tracked
flow-sensitively. The remainder of the heap is abstracted into a finite number of
type variables JC.@xK – one for each instance variable @x of each class C.
Logically, VEx establishes a global typing invariant of the form
IEx (ty) ∆= ∀o.
∧
C∈C
(JoK ∈ {C} → ∧
@x∈VC
Jo.@xK ∈ ty(JC.@xK))
for a VEx -typing ty , stating the fact that the types assigned to the type variablesJC.@xK in ty are over-approximating the actual types of those instance variables.
Also, automatic verifiers provide for each program location the return type of the
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previously executed expression as well as the types of all variables tracked flow-
sensitively. Logically, those can be regarded as a conjunction of typing literals
(see below). Additionally, path sensitivity allows differentiating different paths
leading to a program location and hence requires expressing alternatives, leading
us to a disjunctive normal form of typing literals. Hence, only the literals allowed
in typing assertions are verifier-specific7. For VEx we define
TAsrt 3 τ ::= µ | τ ∨ τ | τ ∧ τ , TLitEx 3 µ ::= ¬µ | JuK ∈ T | Jthis.@xK ∈ T
We will now define how to extract type information from Hoare logic proofs.
In such a proof, each postcondition may contain flow-sensitive type information
about variables as well as the return value r of the previous expression. Given an
assertion p, one extracts this information by first converting p into disjunctive
normal form, treating typing literals, equations and quantifiers as literals and
then applying a projection prX : Asrt 7→ TAsrtX that preserves ∧,∨, µ while
mapping all literals 6∈ TLitX to true (∆= JthisK ∈ >). Every assertion p thus
implies prX(p). Note that depending on the structure of p, there might be a
significant loss of precision. This is unproblematic, however, as supplying type
information is in the user’s interest. The following theorems show that sufficiently
precise type information can always be supplied for type-safe programs.
Lemma 1. For every assertion p and every VX-typing assertion τ such that
p→ τ , there exists an equivalent assertion p′ ↔ p such that prX(p′) = τ .
A VX -typing assertion τ is most precise for an assertion p iff p → τ and for all
VX -typing assertions τ ′, p→ τ ′ implies τ → τ ′.
Theorem 3. For every verifier VX , each type safety proof ψ has an equivalent
proof ψ′, such that for every assertion p′ in ψ′, prX(p
′) is most precise for p′.
Furthermore, one can define a projection prxX further projecting VX typing as-
sertions to summary types for the variable x such that for all assertions p, all
variables x and all verifiers VX we have p→ JxK ∈ prxX(p). For VEx :
prxEx (JxK ∈ T ) ∆= T , prxEx (Jx′K ∈ T ) ∆= > with x′ 6= x,
prxEx (¬µ) ∆= > \ prxEx (µ)
prxEx (τ ∧ τ ′) ∆= prxEx (τ) u prxEx (τ ′), prxEx (τ ∨ τ ′) ∆= prxEx (τ) unionsq prxEx (τ ′)
We extend prxX to assertions by defining pr
x
X
∆
= prxX ◦ prX . Using it, every
type safety proof ψ gives rise to a VX -typing tyψ assigning every sub-statement
S the type prrX(q1 ∧ ...∧ qk) where qi are the postconditions of all Hoare triples
of the form {pi}S{qi} in ψ.
Theorem 4 (Completeness relative to Hoare logic). Given completeness
of the Hoare logic, for every type-safe program pi there exists a type safety proof
ψ such that tyψ is sound and precise enough to establish type safety: tyψ v ty†pi.
It follows that no (sound) typing can be more precise than a type safety
proof. It is hence possible to translate from all other kinds of typings into them
without incurring any loss of precision.
7 Adding the literals u = null and this.@x = null allows tracking null values.
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6 Semi-Automation
As type safety is undecidable and full automation hence only achievable at the
expense of completeness, we instead aim at semi-automation by integrating a
suitable automatic type safety verifier into Hoare logic. Such verifiers have to
satisfy the following requirements:
– Soundness - it safely over-approximates the actual program behavior.
– Monotonicity - increasing precision cannot create type errors.
– Refinements - provides an interface to supply trusted assumptions for in-
creasing precision (Section 6.1). These must be treated
• Flow sensitively - assumptions should have an associated program loca-
tion and affect only data flows from that location onward.
• Path sensitively - assumptions should be able to use disjunctions (∨)
to express alternatives. The verifier should treat these alternatives like
different paths reaching the associated program location.
– Termination - terminates on all inputs (programs).8
Note that flow- and path sensitivity are required only for refinements9, not for the
verifier itself. Also, the chosen Hoare logic must be powerful enough to express
the verifier’s reasoning. While we consider these requirements to be modest and
can hardly imagine an analysis not amendable using this approach, proving this is
difficult. In this paper we will therefore concentrate on automatic verifiers based
on flow-analysis which are known to contain quite powerful analyses [18,32,28].
6.1 An Examplary Automatic Type Safety Verifier
In this section we will introduce an exemplary automatic type safety verifier VEx
to in the following complement our abstract discussion with concrete examples
using VEx -typings.
To also shed some light on the minimum requirements above, we chose a
minimalistic one exactly fulfilling these criteria. VEx is based on a sound, flow-
sensitive data flow analysis and resembles the work of Palsberg et al. [22]. As
required, we allow specifying a set of path-sensitive trusted assumptions. How-
ever, the analysis does not introduce path-sensitivity by itself.
Flow Sensitivity Intra-procedurally, local variables as well as instance variables
of the current object are tracked flow-sensitively. As usual, this is realized by
converting all statements to static single-assignment form (SSA) with respect
to these variables prior to analysis. A VEx -typing ty hence assigns one type
ty(JxK, L) per program location L to each such variable x.
Path Sensitivity To realize intra-procedural path-sensitivity, for each path
j ∈ path(S↓) from the start of a method to each program location S↓ in the
8 Potentially non-terminating analyses like [16] must be performed iteratively by first
generating a base result and then refining it towards higher precision (similar to [28]):
thus, they can be interrupted any time and yield the most precise result reached.
9 Flow- or path-insensitive assumptions would increase the annotation-burden.
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method, the previous sub-statement S and each flow-sensitively tracked variable
x are assigned distinct types ty(JSK, j) and ty(JxK, S↓, j) respectively. Program
locations are denoted by ↓S (or S↓) for the beginning (end) of a sub-statement
S of pi.
Null Pointers Although [22] is a pure type analysis, we use the same algorithm
to also perform null-pointer analysis. This is realized by defining the value null
as the only instance of a class Null and furthermore explicitly inserting the class
Null into all types whose expression may evaluate to null instead of implicitly
allowing null to be element of every type’s domain. We hence defineJxK ∈ {Null ,C1, ...,Cn} ≡ x = null ∨ JxK ∈ {C1, ...,Cn}
The interested reader may find a more detailed account of algorithm VEx in
Appendix C.
Verifier
Assertions
Assertions
Weak Second-Order Logic
⊆Ξ
prf
Typing
Automatic
Type Safety
Data-Flow Analysis
Fig. 7. Overview of the logics involved and the mappings between them
Typings to Logic The function ΞX maps the type information contained in
a flow-sensitive, path-sensitive VX -typing ty for each program location L into a
typing assertion. VEx -typings ty are flow-sensitive, as ty(JxK, L), the type of the
variable x at program location L takes strong updates into account. Hence, for
VEx -typings, the function ΞEx can be defined as:
ΞEx (ty ,
↓S) ∆=
∨
j∈path(↓S)
∧
x∈VM(↓S)JxK ∈ ty(JxK, ↓S, j)
ΞEx (ty , S
↓) ∆=
∨
j∈path(S↓)
(JrK ∈ ty(JSK, j) ∧∧x∈VM(S↓)JxK ∈ ty(JxK, S↓, j))
where S is a sub-statement of pi,M(L) denotes the method a program loca-
tion L belongs to and VC.m ∆= var(SC.m) ∪ change(SC.m).
Definition 4 (Refinement of Typings). Let ty be a VEx -typing derived for a
program pi. Then a conjunctive refinement step of ty using the trusted assump-
tion τ at program location L is a quadruple (ty , τ, L, ty ′), written ty
τ,L→Ex ty ′
with the VEx -typing ty ′ being derived for a program pi′ resulting from pi by in-
serting the Statement Rτ just before L and Rτ being defined inductively as
RJxK∈T ∆= x := x u T 10
Rµ∧µ′ ∆= Rµ;Rµ′
Rν∨ν′ ∆= if... thenRνelse Rν′ end11
10 the type filter x u T is defined in Appendix C
11 the condition does not matter as VEx will treat conditionals non-deterministically
anyway.
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Theorem 5. For all conjunctive refinements ty
τ,L→Ex ty ′, ty ′ v ty holds.
6.2 Translating Typings into Proofs
Definition 5 (Typing Proof). A typing proof ψ for a VX-typing ty of a state-
ment S is a minimal12 proof of the property {p}S{true} for some precondition p
in Hoare logic for partial correctness that for every sub-expression e of S contains
a Hoare triple {pe}e{qe} with prrX(qe) v ty(e).
Technically, ψ only establishes soundness of the typing ty (by being a Hoare logic
proof and tyψ v ty). However, when tyψ v ty†S , ψ can be turned into a type
safety proof by changing the proof system to Hoare logic for type-safe partial
correctness and trivially establishing the type safety preconditions. Hence, typing
proofs are well-suited as intermediate steps towards type safety proofs.
Recall that VX -typings can be checked for soundness using a VX -specific in-
ference system. It is hence possible to extend ΞX to mechanically derive a typing
proof ψ = ΞX(pi, ty) for a sound VX -typing ty for a program pi by translating
the rules of this inference system into Hoare logic and establishing IX(ty) as
a global invariant. In such a proof, each assertion p at program location L is
exactly the typing assertion ΞX(ty , L). We hence write ΞX(ψ,L)
∆
= ΞX(ty , L).
The interested reader may find an examplary translation for VEx -typings in
Appendix D. Note that ΞX allows using automatically derived type informa-
tion in Hoare logic proofs even in theorem proving environments trusting only
propositions that they verified a proof for.
6.3 Two-Layered Proofs
A two-layered proof is a Hoare logic proof for a type-safe notion of correctness
of a dynamically-typed program, in which every assertion has the form τ ∧ p for
a typing assertion τ and an assertion p. While p is user-editable, τ is meant to
be created and modified solely by an automated type safety verifier. We refer to
τ as the “lower layer” and p as the “higher layer” of the proof/assertion.
Theorem 6 (Two-Layered Proof Construction). Given a typing proof φl
and a proof φh for the same program pi, it is always possible to construct a
two-layered-proof φ with φl as lower and φh as higher layer.
Starting from a typing proof ΞX(pi, ty) in the lower layer and only true in the
higher layer, proofs in the higher layer are supported by type information from
the lower layer (Section 4). The type information may also be refined:
Definition 6 (Refinement of Typing Proofs). Let ψ = ΞX(pi, ty) be a typ-
ing proof generated by a typing ty of a program pi. Then each conjunctive refine-
ment step ty
τ,L→ ty ′ gives rise to a conjunctive proof refinement step ψ τ,L→ ψ′
with ψ′ = ΞX(pi, ty ′).
12 all Hoare triples in ψ must contribute to establishing the conclusion.
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Let ψl = ΞX(pi, ty) be the lower layer of a two-layered proof ψ. Then whenever
a typing literal appears within the higher layer p of an assertion at program
location L in ψ, the lower-layer proof ψl is substituted by the result ψ
′
l of the
conjunctive proof refinement step ψl
prX(p),L→ ψ′l. In such refinements ΞX(ψ′l, L′)
→ ΞX(ψl, L′) holds for all L′ due to Theorem 5. Higher layer proof steps
depending on lower layer information hence remain valid.
7 Verifying the Evaluator Example
To demonstrate how the techniques developed enable the convenient verification
of dynamically typed programs despite hard typing problems, we will proof the
evaluator example both type-safe and correct. Figure 8 shows all annotations13
necessary to prove that calc() derives a given term’s value.
Type safety: The given invariant enables deriving the assertions on lines 2-4
and hence a proper typing of the remaining program. As a property of the ad-hoc
data structure it must be established in the (omitted) method parse(). With
the types of env (S 7→ N) and r (N) known, their mapping can be automated.
The complex ad-hoc data structure tree is given the (imprecise) type N 7→ O
and its elements hence need manual mapping. These mappings are encapsulated
in predicates (valuetree2 , vartree3 , optree5 ) and furthermore ignored.
Correctness (marked): The lower layer information allows identifying numer-
ous pure expressions (tree[1], env[tree[1]], tree[1] == ADD, etc.). Estab-
lishing the specified property for the first two branches then only requires apply-
ing PURE EXPR. The conditional in line 5 can be handled by PURE COND.
Since all arguments to the recursive method calls in that line are also pure,
{optree2 (t̂ree, ênv)∧t̂ree[1] = ÂDD} calc(env, tree[2]) + calc(env, tree[3])
{treeval3 (t̂ree, ênv, r)} can be derived automatically. Note that all implications
can be handled by SMT solvers with theories for Presburger arithmetic and lists
for which effective decision procedures are known and do not require reasoning
about graph-like object structures .
8 Related Work
There are several threads of related work regarding dynamically typed programs.
In each, we can only discuss those works most closely related to ours.
Type Safety: Cartwright [6] pioneered a strand of work called “soft typing”,
applying automated type safety verifiers to dynamically typed languages with
the aim of improving performance. Another line of work is “gradual typing”
[26,4], letting the user decide which parts of the program should be statically
checked for type errors, while dynamically typing the remaining program. 14
13 Again, all recursive predicates can instead be expressed using quantification over
sequences, at the expense of readability
14 The two may also be combined [24]
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def valuetree2 (t, n)
∆
= N(t[0], V̂ALUE)∧N(t[1], n), valuetree1 (t) ∆= ∃n. valuetree2 (t, n)
def vartree3 (t, e, x)
∆
= N(t[0], V̂AR) ∧ S(t[1], x) ∧ e[x] 6= null
def vartree2 (t, e)
∆
= ∃x. vartree3 (t, e, x)
def optree5 (t, e, op, l, r)
∆
= N(t[0], ÔP) ∧ N(t[1], op) ∧ L(t[2], l) ∧ parsetree2 (l, e) ∧
L(t[3], r) ∧ parsetree2 (r, e)
def optree2 (t, e)
∆
= ∃op, l, r. optree5 (t, e, op, l, r)
def parsetree2 (t, e)
∆
= valuetree1 (t) ∨ vartree2 (t, e) ∨ optree2 (t, e)
def treeval3 (tree, env , n)
∆
=
valuetree2 (tree, n) ∨
∃x. vartree3 (tree, env , x) ∧ env [x] = n ∨
∃op, l, r, nl, nr. optree5 (tree, env , op, l, r) ∧ treeval3 (l, env , nl) ∧
treeval3 (r, env , nr) ∧
op = ÂDD→ n = nl + nr ∧ ...
inv ∀t, e. parsetree2 (t , e)→
t[0] = V̂ALUE → valuetree1 (t) ∧ t[0] = V̂AR → vartree2 (t , e) ∧ t[0] = ÔP →
optree2 (t , e)
{parsetree2 (t̂ree, ênv)}
1 method calc(env, tree = @tree) {
2 if tree[0] = VALUE then {valuetree1 (t̂ree)} tree[1]
3 elseif tree[0] = VAR then {vartree2 (t̂ree, ênv)} env[tree[1]]
4 elseif tree[0] = OP then {optree2 (t̂ree, ênv)}
5 if tree[1] = ADD then calc(env, tree[2]) + calc(env, tree[3])
6 elseif ...
7 else nil
8 fi
9 else nil
10 fi
11 }
{treeval3 (t̂ree, ênv, r̂)}
Fig. 8. Correctness proof for the evaluator example
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Both soft- and gradual typing require rewriting of program parts in exchange
for type safety guarantees. On the contrary, our approach is able to provide such
guarantees also for parts that are not statically typable. Also, the user is free to
omit type safety from the specification (dynamic typing) and may still rewrite the
program to allow automatic checking (static typing), both on a per-expression
basis (gradual). With respect to correctness, our approach hence subsumes both
soft and gradual typing. However, it does not (yet) increase performance.
Others [13,20], have extended such abstraction-based verifiers to handle many
ideoms common in dynamically typed languages.
Correctness: To the best of our knowlegdge, [12] currently is the only15 ax-
iomatic semantics for a type-safe notion of correctness of a dynamically typed
language. Like discussed in Section 2.1 it uses type safety preconditions, con-
siders all variables to be of object type and does not use pure expressions and
would thus benefit from our approach.
Nguyen et al. [21] proposed an automatic contract verifier for untyped higher-
order functional languages based on symbolic execution inserting run-time checks
for contracts it cannot statically guarantee. Since they use a mechanism similar
to widening to enforce termination, their apporach also combines abstraction-
based and symbolic reasoning.
Drawing on their work on the verification of untyped higher-order functional
programs [9], Chugh et al. [8,7] provide a dependent-type system for an untyped
functional “core calculus” λJS JavaScript programs can be translated into. No
soundness is demonstrated for their system.
Swamy et al. [29] semi-automatically reason about a wide range of JavaScript
ideoms by translating into the dependently-typed functional language F ∗ and
using its SMT-based reasoning engine. They also noticed that the type infor-
mation generated by an abstraction-based type safety verifier (GateKeeper in
their case) are useful to improve the effectiveness of automatic reasoning en-
gines. However, they did not feed the symbolically derived proof results back
into GateKeeper and did not use the type information to ease the annotation
burden for their users. Since their main focus lies on a novel encoding of Dijk-
stra’s predicate transformer semantics allowing F ∗’s dependent type inference
to effectively reason about imperative programs in a style similar to Hoare logic,
we consider the approaches to be largely complementary.
In general, all fully automatic approaches [6,21,13,9] are necessarily incom-
plete. They can however be used as automatic type safety verifiers. Furthermore,
all purely symbolic approaches [9,8,29,12,23] require all type information to be
manually specified in method contracts and loop invariants.
Both the idea and the term “Layer of abstraction” are inspired by the work of
Gardner et al. [12] on reasoning about JavaScript. However, their work abstracts
from the peculiarities of the JavaScript variable store, while ours abstracts from
the complexity of dynamic typing and is applicable to virtually any dynamically
typed language.
15 [23] only treat partial correctness. Also, they restrict the programming language to
allow a form of (type-unsafe) pure expressions
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The decomposition rule used to establish the layer of abstraction is inspired
by similar constructions in [1].
Some tools for verification of statically typed imperative programs [10] allow
using a “pure” subset of the programming language (that is side-effect-free and
guaranteed to terminate) within assertions. The ability of our layer of abstraction
to allow the use of well-typed “pure” program expressions in assertions can be
seen as an extension of this idea to dynamically typed programs.
Combining Static Analysis with Program Logics: There has been a consid-
erable amount of work on integrating algorithmic decision procedures (mostly
model checking) and deductive methods for program verification (See [31] for
pointers). Due to the deep connection between data flow analysis and model
checking [25], many of these techniques can be considered as related.
Note that our conjunctive refinement differs from abstraction refinement since
it is not the abstraction that is refined, but the analysis result.
Also, translations from typings (f.i. from type systems for information-flow
properties) to program logics are commonly used in the Proof-Carrying Code
Community [14] to avoid the need for property-specific proof-checkers. Although
PCC is a completely different application area, their aim was also to integrate
results derived by different inference systems into one common representation –
and incidently they also chose a program logic as their “lingua franca”.
A closely related proposal also integrating symbolic with abstraction-based
reasoning is MIXY[19], a framework for mixing symbolic execution with type
checking. In their system, the user divides his/her program into s-blocks and
t-blocks. While s-blocks are analysed using symbolic execution, type analysis is
applied to t-blocks. The results of both analyses are bidirectionally exchanged
using so-called MIX-rules: Type analysis results are translated into a matching
start environment for symbolic execution and types ensured by (exhaustive!)
symbolic execution can be used for type analysis. Also, the aim is related: What
Phang et. al called “balancing precision vs. efficiency” is the same as “combining
automation with completeness”, although Phang et al. do not proof their system
complete. Our approach could most likely be integrated into their framework as
“Hoare-Logic blocks” {h e h} with typing Γ ` {h e h} : τ for which a Hoare-
triple {pe}e{qe} must be derived where pe ∆= ΞX(Γ ) and prrX(qe) = τ for some
verifier VX .
9 Conclusion & Future Work
The approach presented allows verifying dynamically typed programs just like
statically typed ones, requiring manual assistance only on hard typing problems.
If a program is statically-typable, there is no difference. Otherwise, the user may
freely choose whether going beyond the limits of the type system is worth the
verification effort. While the stated requirements for automated verifiers allow
conveniently using the technique, more powerful verifiers can be expected to
significantly increase the degree of automation. Being gradually applicable like
gradual typing and automated like soft typing, the approach allows deriving type
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safety guarantees also for code parts that cannot be startically typed. Should it
turn out to be practically usable, it would suggest dynamic typing as a serious
alternative to static typing for verifiable languages that have all necessary infras-
tructure readily available. Until then, there are several useful ways to extended
this work:
Completeness: Currently, there is no (relative) complete Hoare logic for a dy-
namically typed language. While the approach is also applicable to incomplete
program logics, no completeness guarantee can be provided in this case.
Other Program Logics: [8,29] are both based on refinement types. Recently,
it has been shown [30] how to extend such systems to provide (relative) com-
pleteness like Hoare logic. It would be interesting to investigate if our approach
is also applicable to such program logics.
Other Program Analyses: The formalization of semi-automation suggests
that it could be generalizable to arbitrary data flow analyses.
Performance: The derived type information could be used to omit run-time
checks and generate more efficient binaries.
Features: The current concept excludes optional variables and type errors as
exceptions. Also, closures and advanced dynamic features like method update,
dynamic type hierarchies and eval() should be studied.
Implementation: An implementation would allow evaluating the practical use-
fulness of the concept.
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A Appendix: Identifying and Translating Pure
Expressions
Identifying pure expressions (pure : Ts × Exprd 7→ B)
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pure(e)
∆
= τ(e) defined, τ(e) = inf ({T | pure(T, e)})
pure(Null ,null)
∆
= true, ∀e ∈ Exprd. pure(Null , e)→ pure(O, e)
pure(T,u) ∆= JuK ∈ T ∧ Ψ(T ) = T ∧ safeT(u) (includes the case of this)
pure(T,@x) ∆= Jthis.@xK ∈ T ∧ Ψ(T ) = T ∧ safeT(@x)
pure(B, e is a? C) ∆= pure(O, e)
pure(B, e1 == e2)
∆
= ∃T ∈ Ts. pure(T, e1) ∧ pure(T, e2)
pure(T, e0.m(e1, ..., en))
∆
=
∃T0, ...,Tn. pure(Ti, ei) for i ∈ Nn ∧ Ψ(T0.m(T1, ...,Tn)→ T) defined
pure(T,new C(e1, ..., en))
∆
=
∃T1, ...,Tn. pure(Ti, ei) for i ∈ N1n ∧ Ψ(Ψ({C}).init(T1, ...,Tn) → T)
defined
pure(T,u := e) ∆= false
pure(T,@v := e) ∆= false
pure(T,while e do S od) ∆= false
pure(T, if e then S1 else S2 fi)
∆
= pure(B, e) ∧ Si ≡ ei ∧ pure(T, ei) for i ∈
{1, 2}
Translation of pure expressions into logical expressions (Ψ : Ts×Exprd 7→ LExp)
Ψ(e)
∆
= Ψτ(e)(e), ΨT(x)
∆
= xˆ
ΨNull(null)
∆
= null, (ΨNull(e) = p)→ (ΨO(e) = p)
ΨT(e0.m(e1, ..., en))
∆
= l[v0, ..., vn := ΨT0(e0), ..., ΨTn(en)]
where pure(Ti, ei) for i ∈ Nn and Ψ(T0.m(T1, ...,Tn)→ T) = l.
ΨT(new C(e1, ..., en))
∆
= l[v1, ..., vn := ΨT1(e1), ..., ΨTn(en)]
where pure(Ti, ei) for i ∈ N1n and Ψ(Ψ({C}).init(T1, ...,Tn)→ T) = l.
ΨB(e1 == e2)
∆
= ΨT(e1) = ΨT(e2) where pure(T, ei) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
ΨB(e is a? C)
∆
= JΨO(e)K ∈ {C}
ΨT(if e then e1 else e2 fi)
∆
= if ΨB(e) then ΨT(e1) else ΨT(e2) fi
Proof Rules for pure expressions
RULE: PURE LOOP ( strong type-safe partial correctness)
{p ∧ Ψ(e)}S{p}
where pure(e), τ(e) = B{p} while e do S od {p ∧ ¬Ψ(e) ∧ r = null}
RULE: PURE METH
{p}u0.m(u1, ...,un){q}
{p[uˆ0, ..., uˆn := Ψ(e0), ..., Ψ(en)]}e0.m(e1, ..., en){q}
where ui ∈ VL fresh and pure(ei) for all i ∈ Nn.
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Soundness
Proof. The Axiom PURE EXPR can be established by induction over the struc-
ture of the pure expression e, using the guarantees provided by pure(e). In the
cases for variables, pure(x) implies safeT(x) for some type T. In the case for
method calls, we assume
{p[rˆ := Ψ(T0.m(T1, ...,Tn)→ T]}u0.m(u1, ...,un){p}
with Ti = τ(ui) for all i ∈ Nn to be established for all methods inMε (which is
precisely the meaning of “correspondence between methods and operations with
respect to the mapping Ψ” in Section 4.3).
The rules PURE ASGN, PURE COND, PURE LOOP and PURE METH
can then be derived by combining the axiom PURE EXPR with the dyn rules
for ASGN, COND, LOOP and METH respectively. uunionsq
B Appendix: Axiomatic Semantics for dyn
AXIOM: CONST
{p[r := null ]}null{p}
AXIOM: VAR
{p[r := u]}u{p}
Note: includes the case of u ≡ this.
AXIOM: IVAR
{p[r := this.@v]}@v{p}
RULE: ASGN (both normal and instance variables)
{p}e{q[u := r]}
where u ∈ V{p}u := e{q}
RULE: SEQ
{p}S1{r} {r}S2{q}
{p}S1;S2{q}
RULE: Conditional (COND) ( strong type-safe partial correctness)
{p}e{r ∧ bool test}
{r ∧ b}S1{q}
{r ∧ ¬b}S2{q}
{p} if e then S1 else S2 fi {q}
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where b is a predicate and bool test ≡ r 6= null ∧ JrK ∈ {bool} ∧ B(r, b)
RULE: LOOP ( strong type-safe partial correctness)
{p}e{p ∧ r ∧ bool test}
{p ∧ r ∧ b}S{p}
{p} while e do S od {p ∧ ¬b ∧ r = null}
where b is a predicate and bool test is defined as in COND.
RULE: CONS
p→ p1, {p1}S{q1}, q1 → q
{p}S{q}
RULE: PASGN
{p[−→u := −→t ]}−→u := −→t {p}
where {−→u } ⊆ VL and {−→t } ⊆ VL ∪ {null}.
RULE: BLCK
{p}−→u−→u := −→t −−→null;S{q}
when (VL \ {r}) ∩ free(q) = ∅{p} begin local −→u := −→t ;S end{q}
where {−→u } ⊆ VL, {−→t } ⊆ VL ∪{null}, {−→u } = VL \ ({−→u }∪VS) and |−−→null| = |−→u |.
RULE: METH
{pi}ei{pi+1[ui := r]} for i ∈ Nn
{pn+1}u0.m(u1, ...,un){q}
{p0}e0.m(e1, ..., en){q}
where ui fresh,ui ∈ VL,ui 6∈ var(ej) ∪ change(ej) for all i, j ∈ Nn.
RULE: REC ( strong typesafe partial correctness)
A ` {p}S{q},
A ` {pi}begin local this,−→ui := v′i,−→vi ;Si end{qi}, i ∈ N1n
pi → ( v′i 6= null ∧ v′i 6= null → v′i.@c = ρCi ), i ∈ N1n
{p}S{q}
where method mi(
−→ui){Si} ∈ MCi andA ≡ {p1}v′1.m1(−→v1){q1}, ..., {pn}v′n.mn(−→vn){qn}.
RULE: CNSTR
{p}newC.init(−→e ){q}
{p}new C(−→e ){q}
AXIOM: NEW
{p[r := newC]}newC{p}
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B.1 Auxiliary Rules
RULE: DISJ
{p}S{q} {r}S{q}
{p ∨ r}S{q}
RULE: CONJ
{p1}S{q1} {p2}S{q2}
{p1 ∧ p2}S{q1 ∧ q2}
RULE: ∃-INT
{p}S{q}
{∃x.p}S{q}
where x 6∈ var(M) ∪ var(S) ∪ free(q).
RULE: INV
{r}S{q}
{p ∧ r}S{p ∧ q}
where free(p) ∩ (change(M) ∪ change(S)) = ∅ and p does not contain quantifi-
cation over objects.
RULE: SUBST
{p}S{q}
{p[−→z := −→t ]}S{q[−→z := −→t ]}
where var(−→z )∩ (var(M)∪var(S)) = var(−→t )∩ (change(M)∪ change(S)) = ∅.
C Appendix: Automatic Type Safety Verifier VEx
To allow for intra-procedural flow-sensitivity, all statements S are converted to
static single-assignment form (SSA) for local- as well as instance variables of the
current object. This necessitates that each occurrence of such a variable x having
some number of assignments, say n, is replaced by one of its k ≥ n “versions”
x1, ..., xk such that each version has exactly one assignment dominating all its
occurrences (except φ-occurrences16). We maintain a mapping υ(x, L) from vari-
ables x ∈ V and program locations L of pi to the version xi whose assignment
dominates this location.
Next, each sub-statement S of the program pi is given a type variable JSK. For
each method C.m, additional type variables JPC.mi K for each of its parameters,JRC.mK for its return value and JV C.mu,i K for each version ui of each local variable
u are added. Instance variables @v ∈ VC are given both a global type variable
16 for k − n versions, so-called φ-assignments are inserted at control-flow joins. The
occurrences in such assignments need not be dominated.
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JVC.@vK and type variables JV C.mC.@v,iK for each version @vi in methods C.m using
them.
The constraint generation then proceeds as follows: for every method declara-
tion method m(u1, ...,un){SC.m} of class C we generate the following constraints:JPC.mi K v JuiK, JSC.mK v JRC.mK, JVC.@vK v JV C.mC.@v,0K
for all i ∈ N1n for all @v used in C.m
Additionally, we traverse the parse tree of the body SC.m of the method C.m
applying the rules given in Figure 9.
In the body of a method C.m:
null =⇒ JnullK = {} ui := e =⇒ JeK v JuiK ∧ Jui := eK = JeK
ui =⇒ JuiK = JV C.mu,i K @vi := e =⇒ JeK v J@viK v JVC.@vK ∧ J@vi := eK = JeK
@vi =⇒ J@viK = JV C.mC.@v,iK e.m(e1, ..., en) =⇒ JeK v [m(Je1K, ..., JenK)→ Je.m(...)K]
this =⇒ JthisK = {C} S; e =⇒ JS; eK = JeK
if e then S1 else S2 fi =⇒ JeK v {bool} ∧ JS1K unionsq JS2K v Jif ... fiK
while e do S od =⇒ JeK v {bool} ∧ Jwhile ... odK = {}
new C′(e1, ..., en) =⇒ {C′} v [init(Je1K, ..., JenK)→ Jnew C′(...)K]
φ(e1, ..., en) =⇒ Je1K unionsq ... unionsq JenK v Jφ(e1, ..., en)K
e u T =⇒ JeK u T v Je u T K
Fig. 9. VEx typing rules for dyn
The resulting system of set inclusion constraints can be solved by propagating
the type information from constructor calls forwards along the data flow and
whenever a type C reaches a type variable of the form [m(T1, ..., Tn) → R]
(generated by a method call), the method C.m of arity n is looked up and the
following connection constraints are addedJTiK v JPC.mi K for all i ∈ N1n, JRC.mK v JRK
Upon reching a fixpoint, the analysis provides a solution ty (a typing) map-
ping each type variable (and thus every sub-statement, variable, parameter and
return value) to a union type in T . To mask the initial conversion to SSA we
define ty(x)
∆
=
⊔
i ty(xi) for all variables x tracked flow-sensitively.
A typing ty is called consistent iff for every constraint JS1K v JS2K it holds
that ty(JS1K) v ty(JS2K). An important property of typing rules is for consis-
tency to imply soundness. Note that the constraints marked in Figure 9 serve
to ensure sufficient precision (ty v ty†pi) rather than soundness. When omitting
these constraints, the algorithm outputs a sound typing even when its precision
is insufficient to establish type safety.
By intra-procedural path-sensitivity we mean that the algorithm maintains a
set of alternatives path(L) for each program location L and for each j ∈ path(L)
separately derives the types of flow-sensitively tracked variables ty(υ(x, L), j) as
well as results of the previous sub-statement ty(JSK, j) with L = S↓. In VEx ,
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path sensitivity is only introduced by specially marked ifPS-conditionals dupli-
cating the number of paths leading to them. Note that eliminating equivalent
alternatives is important to keep the analysis terminating in the presence of
loops17. However, as these markings are only used in the definition of trusted
assumptions below, usually |path(L)| = 1 for all L.
Logic to Typings As listed in the requirements in Section 2.4, verifiers VX
need an interface for supplying trusted assumptions. Abstractly, one defines a
refinement relation ty
τ,L→ ty ′ between VX -typings. Here, ty ′ refines ty by taking
the trusted assumption τ at program location L into account. For VEx we first
extend dyn expressions by introducing a type filter operation e ::= T u e gener-
ating the (monotone) typing constraint T uJeK v JtueK. By inserting type filters,
it is possible to refine a typing assertion τ ≡ Ξ(ty , L) for a program location L
to τ ∧ τ ′ for some asumption τ ′:
Definition 7 (Refinement of Constraint Systems). Let G be a constraint
system generated by applying VEx ’s constraint generation to a program pi. A con-
junctive refinement step of G using the trusted assumption τ at program location
L is a quadruple (G, τ, L,G′), written G
τ,L→Ex G′ with G′ being the constraint
system generated by applying VEx ’s constraint generation to the program pi with
the marked conditional STA(τ) inserted just before program location L. For the
definition of STA(τ), we assume without loss of generality τ ≡ ν1 ∨ ...∨ νn to be
in disjunctive normal form with all conjunctions νi mentioning each variable in
at most one typing literal:
STA(ν ∨ τ) ∆= ifPS ... then STA(ν) else STA(τ) fi,
STA(JxK ∈ T ∧ ν) ∆= STA(JxK ∈ T );STA(ν), STA(JxK ∈ T ) ∆= x := T u x
Note that the condition does not matter as VEx regards conditionals as nonde-
terministic choice. In essence, if τ has n disjuncts νj then all paths reaching the
marked conditional are split into n paths and in each of them, the types JxiK
of all variables xi ∈ free(νj) are refined to JxiK u prxi(νj) for program locations
dominated by L.
D Appendix: Translation from Typings to Typing Proofs
We will now show how to translate a given VEx -typing ty into a typing proof ψ
with tyψ = ty . Note that in contrast to type safety proofs this is possible for
every sound typing ty .
Recall from Section 6.2 that for a VEx -typing ty , the global typing invariant
IEx (ty) states that the types ty(JC.@xK) assigned to instance variables C.@x in
ty safely over-approximate the actual types of these variables for all runs of the
program. Establishing IEx (ty) as an invariant of all method bodies and the main
statement is thus an important step in constructing a typing proof. Fortunately,
IEx (ty) can be shown to be invariant under most proof rules in our logic. The
17 JxK ∈ {C1} ∨ JxK ∈ {C2} is not equivalent to JxK ∈ {C1,C2}! Otherwise, no assump-
tion could type if b then x := “foo′′ else x := 21 end; x + x.
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only complicated cases are the rules for assignment to instance variables and
object creation. For these cases, we introduce new rules that explicitly preserve
the global typing invariant:
RULE: θ-IASGN
{IEx (ty) ∧ τ}e{IEx (ty) ∧ τ ′[this.@x := r]}
with @x ∈ VI{IEx (ty) ∧ τ}@x := e{IEx (ty) ∧ τ ′}
where τ → JthisK ∈ {C}, τ ′ → JrK ∈ T , T ∈ 2C , T v ty(JVC.@xK).
AXIOM: θ-NEW
{IEx (ty) ∧ τ [r := newC ]}newC{IEx (ty) ∧ τ}
Formally deriving soundness of these rules requires intricate details of the
substitutions involved and rather lengthy proofs. Intuitively, assignment to in-
stance variables preserves the global typing invariant if the assignment is com-
patible with the typing (T v ty(JVC.@xK)) and object creation does so because
it initializes all instance variables to null and thus the newly created object sat-
isfies the global typing invariant. For a detailed treatment of the substitutions,
the interested reader is refered to [5,1].
The function Ξ defined below will construct typing proofs from proof steps
like
φ1 . . . φn
(RULE)
X
whereX is a conclusion of the formA ` {p}S{q},
RULE is the name of the proof rule applied, and the φi for i ∈ Nn are subproofs
establishing the premises. For reasoning about recursive method calls, the REC
rule needs a set of assumptions about the methods in pi.
Definition 8. For a dyn program pi with classes C each with a set of methods
MC and a typing ty for pi, the set Api,ty of method call assumptions is
Api,ty ∆= {{p˘C.m}v0.m(v1, ..., vn){q˘C.m} | ∃C ∈ C,m ∈MC}
where p˘C.m
∆
= I(ty) ∧ Jv0K ∈ {C} ∧ ∧ni=1JviK ∈ ty(JP iC.mK) ∧ ∧ki=1Jv0.@viK ∈
ty(VC.@vi) and q˘C.m
∆
= I(ty) ∧ JrK ∈ ty(JRC.mK), method m is of arity n and C
has k instance variables.
We are now ready to state the definition of Ξ:
Definition 9. Translation Ξ for Programs
Given a dyn program pi with a main statement S and a set of methods M and
a VEx -typing ty for pi, the function Ξ(pi, ty) yields a typing proof for ty. It is
defined as follows:
Ξ(pi, ty)
∆
=
Ξ(Api,ty ` {true}S{true}, ty)
Ξ(Api,ty ` bC.m, ty) for C.m(−→u ){SC.m} ∈ M
(REC)` {true}S{true}
with bC.m
∆
= {p˘C.m}begin local this,−→u := −→v ;SC.m end{q˘C.m} where p˘C.m and
q˘C.m are given in Definition 8.
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Definition 10. Translation Ξ for Statements and Expressions
For a given VEx -typing ty of a dyn statement S and a Hoare logic statement X
of the form
X ≡ A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓S)}S{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓)}
with A a set of assumptions, Ξ(X, ty) yields a typing proof for ty with precon-
dition Ξ(ty , ↓S) and under the assumptions A.
Ξ is defined inductively over the structure of S and in essence models the
reasoning of the verifier VEx as an equivalent combination of Hoare logic rule
applications. The Hoare triples of above form are then assembled into a full
typing proof.
if S ≡ null, Ξ(ty , ↓S) ≡ Ξ(ty , S↓)[r := null ] then
Ξ(X, ty) = (CONST)
18
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓S)}null{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓)}
if S ≡ u, Ξ(ty , ↓S) ≡ Ξ(ty , S↓)[r := u] then
Ξ(X, ty) =
(VAR)
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓S)}u{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓)}
if S ≡ @x, Ξ(ty , ↓S) ≡ Ξ(ty , S↓)[this.@x := r] then
Ξ(X, ty) =
(IVAR)
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓S)}@x{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓)}
if S ≡ u := e, Ξ(ty , ↓S)→ Ξ(ty , ↓e), Ξ(ty , e↓)→ Ξ(ty , S↓)[u := r] then
Ξ(X, ty) =
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓e)}e{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , e↓)}
(CONS)
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓S)}e{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓)[u := r]}
(ASGN)
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓S)}u := e{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓)}
if S ≡ @x := e, Ξ(ty , ↓S) → Ξ(ty , ↓e), Ξ(ty , e↓) → Ξ(ty , S↓)[this.@x := r]
then
Ξ(X, ty) =
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓e)}e{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , e↓)}
(CONS)
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓S)}e{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓)[this.@x := r]}
(θ-IASGN)
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓S)}@x := e{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓)}
if S ≡ S ≡ ife thenS1elseS2 end, Ξ(ty , e↓) → JrK ∈ {bool}, Ξ(ty , ↓S) →
Ξ(ty , ↓e), Ξ(ty , e↓) → Ξ(ty , ↓S1), Ξ(ty , e↓) → Ξ(ty , ↓S2), Ξ(ty , S↓1 ) →
Ξ(ty , S↓), Ξ(ty , S↓2 )→ Ξ(ty , S↓) then
Ξ(X, ty) =
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A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓e)}e{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , e↓)}
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓S1)}S1{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓1 )}
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓S2)}S2{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓2 )}
(CONS)
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓e)}e{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , e↓)}
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , e↓)}S1{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓1 )}
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , e↓)}S2{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓2 )}
(CONS)
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓S)}e{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓)}
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓S)}S1{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓)}
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓S)}S2{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓)}
(COND)
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓S)}if e thenS1 else S2 end{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓)}
if S ≡ e0.m(e1, ..., en), Ξ(ty , e↓i ) → Ξ(ty , ↓ei+1) for i ∈ Nn, Ξ(ty , ↓S) →
Ξ(ty , ↓e0), {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , e↓n)}u0.m(u1, ...,un){I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓)} ∈ A then
Ξ(X, ty) =
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓ei)}ei{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , e↓i )} for i ∈ Nn
(COND + A)
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓S)}ei{I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓S)[ui := r]} for i ∈ Nn
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓S)}u0.m(u1, ...,un){I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓)}
(METH)
A ` {I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , ↓S)}e0.m(e1, ..., en){I(ty) ∧Ξ(ty , S↓)}
Lemma 2. For every dyn program pi and every consistent VEx -typing ty of pi,
Ξ(pi, ty) can be constructed and is a valid typing proof for ty in pi.
Proof. By induction over the structure of the program pi comparing the appli-
cation conditions of Hoare logic rules, the typing rules for VEx and the precon-
ditions for the respective cases in the translation Ξ. uunionsq
Note that this implies soundness of VEx .
E Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Proof for Theorem 1
Proof. By definition of Θ(σ), for all variables x of a base type T in σ, Θ(σ) |=
safeT(x) holds and x can hence be safely mapped. Under the assumption that
for all such variables x it holds that JxˆK(Θ(σ)) = JxK(σ), the following lemma
can be established by induction over the structure of the assertion language:JlK(σ) = JΘ(l)K(Θ(σ)) for all logical expressions l and stat states σ. As the
assumption is guaranteed by the mapping predicates introduced by ΥM , the
desired result can then be established by induction over the structure of the
assertion language. uunionsq
Proof for Theorem 2
Proof. By induction over the structure of the proof φ, using Theorem 1 and the
fact that the application conditions for the pure expression rules are satisfied
when S is a statically typed program and all assertions where translated using
Θ.
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Proof for Lemma 1
Proof. p′ ≡ p ∧ τ has the described properties.
Proof for Theorem 3
Proof. Follows from Lemma ?? and the definition of the most precise typing
assertion.
Proof for Theorem 4
Proof. Follows from completeness of the Hoare logic, Theorem 3 and the fact
that type safety proofs must establish the absence of type errors.
Proof for Lemma 2
Proof. By comparing the application conditions for cases of Ξ with the typing
rules given in Figure 9 and the side conditions of applied Hoare-logic rules. For
instance, in the case for assignment, consistency of the typing implies ty(JeK) =
ty(Jui := eK) and ty(JeK) ⊆ ty(JuiK), by the definitions for SSA it follows
ty(JeK) = ty(Ju := eK) and ty(JeK) ⊆ ty(JuK) and that u is the only variable whose
(flow-sensitive) type may have changed between e↓ and S↓ (r stays the same).
With the definition of Ξ(ty , L) we conclude that Ξ(ty , e↓) ↔ Ξ(ty , S↓)[u :=
r] ∧ JuK ∈ t for some type t. uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Let ty
τ,L→ ty ′ be a conjunctive refinement step and x ∈ VC.m. Then
ty ′(JxK, L) = ty(JxK, L) u ΩxX(τ) v ty(JxK, L). This difference is induced by the
constraints generated from Rτ . Since all other constraints are identical between
pi and pi′ and all constraints are monotonic, ty ′(JSK, L) v ty(JSK, L) for all sub-
statements S of pi and consequently ty ′ v ty follows by induction over the
constraint system. uunionsq
Proof for Theorem 6
For our proof we need the following definition:
Definition 11 (Fusion of Hoare Logic Proofs). Let φ be a Hoare logic
proof for {p}S{q} in some notion of correctness X and ϕ be a typing proof
for {τ}S{τ ′}. Then, the fusion φ+ϕ is a two-layered proof for {p∧ τ}S{q ∧ τ ′}
in the sense of X-correctness.
WLOG, we assume φ and ϕ to be minimal (all Hoare triples contribute to
the proof’s conclusion). They hence have a tree-like structure. Their fusion can
then be constructed by recursion over this structure.
Induction basis = Fusing axioms. All axioms in our Hoare logic (Appendix B),
are invariant under conjunction: if {p}S{q} and {τ}S{τ ′} can be derived using
this axiom, then {p ∧ τ}S{q ∧ τ ′} can also.
Induction step = Fusing rules. All rules in our Hoare logic have the following
properties
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– Invariant under fusion: If{p1}S1{q1}, ..., {pn}Sn{qn}
(X){p}S{q}
and
{τ1}S1{τ ′1}, ..., {τn}Sn{τ ′n}
(X){τ}S{τ ′}
are valid rule applications, then
{p1 ∧ τ1}S1{q1 ∧ τ ′1}, ..., {pn ∧ τn}Sn{qn ∧ τ ′n}
(X){p ∧ τ}S{q ∧ τ ′}
is also.
– They are either syntax-directed (and hence must appear in both proofs) or
have a neutral application
{p}S{q}
(X){p}S{q} that can be inserted into a proof
to make its structure match the other one (having an application of rule X).
For most rules, this is obvious. For applications of CONJ and DISJ, one needs
to fuse the proof with both premises. To see that the properties hold for the
SUBST rule, consider that all variables occurring in typing assertions are being
read in some method of the program (otherwise, typing them is useless). Hence,
the side-condition of the SUBST rule does not allow them to be substituted for
and all applications of this rule hence are neutral for all typing assertions.
Both proofs can hence be made structurally equivalent by inserting neutral
rule applications and then fused using the invariance property. uunionsq
